The Text: 2 Nephi 2:14–16
14And now, my sons,[i] I speak unto you these things for your profit and learning, for there is a God, and he hath created all things—both the heavens and the earth, and all things that in them is,[ii] both things to act and things to be acted upon. 15And to bring about his eternal purposes in the end of man, after he had created our first parents, and the beasts of the field, and the fowls of the air—and in fine, all things which are created—it must needs be that there was an opposition, even the forbidden fruit in opposition to the tree of life, the one being sweet and the other[iii] bitter. 16Wherefore, the Lord God gave unto man that he should act for himself. Wherefore, man could not act for himself save it should be that he were[iv] enticed by the one or the other.
Textual Variants
Royal Skousen’s work offers insights regarding several portions of this week’s reading. See Analysis of Textual Variants of the Book of Mormon, Part 1 (2004), 496-503. A brief summary of his conclusions:
[i] Lehi highlights Jacob’s understanding of God (v. 1-4), and therefore Jacob needs no additional persuasion from Lehi that there is a God. It is more likely that Lehi is speaking to all his sons. Lehi never addresses Jacob as “my son” but as “Jacob my firstborn in the wilderness.” (v. 1, 2, 11). “And now my sons” is repeated (v. 28, 30). The 1830 typesetter changed to “sons” perhaps by accident, but this probably represents the original (not extant).
[ii] The word “is” was replaced with “are” in 1920. Maintain “is” to agree with the KJV language in Exodus 20:11 and Acts 4:24.
[iii] Elsewhere, bitter refers to negatives and sweet with positives (2 Ne. 15:20; Alma 36:21). Here, a “strict parallelism” is unnecessary and other usages of “one” and “other” indicate “simply a contrast or an unordered opposition.”
[iv] The word “were” was replaced with “was” in the 1837 . Keep the subjunctive were.
I find Skousen’s conclusions persuasive and have adopted them here for the purposes of our discussion.
Textual Influence
Profit and learning (1 Nephi 19:23).
God created all things in heaven and earth (Mosiah 4:2, Mosiah 4:9; Mosiah 5:15; Alma 18:28-29; Alma 22:10; 3 Nephi 9:15; Mormon 9:11).
Bring About Great Eternal Purposes (Alma 42:26).
Forbidden fruit (2 Ne. 2:15, 18-19; Mosiah 3:26; Alma 12:22; Helaman 6:26; D&C 29:40).
Tree of Life (1 Ne. 15:36; Alma 5:34, 62; Alma 12:21, 23, 26; Alma 32:40; Alma 42:2-6).
Sweet Bitter (1 Ne. 8:11; 2 Ne. 15:20; Alma 32:42; 36:21; 38:8; 40:26)
Act and Acted Upon (2 Ne. 2:13-14, 26).
Act for Himself/Free to Act for Yourself (2: Ne. 2:16; 2 Ne. 10:23; and Helaman 14:30).
Free to choose (2 Ne. 2:27).
State to Act (Alma 12:31).
Entice (2 Ne. 2:16; 9:39; Helaman 6:26; 7:16; Mosiah 3:19; Moroni 7:13).
These are not exhaustive lists.
Structure of the Text
Verses 14-16 are characterized by frustrating starts, stops, digressions, and incomplete or at best ambiguous sentences. Lehi enumerates God’s creations but then categorizes them as things to act and things to be acted upon. As he begins to explain the purposes in the end of man, he goes back to enumerates more things that are created.
Do we get a better sense of Lehi’s message if we reordered the passage as follows:
And now, my sons, I speak unto you these things for your profit and learning, for there is a God, and he hath created all things—both the heavens and the earth, and all things that in them is, our first parents, and the beasts of the field, and the fowls of the air, both things to act and things to be acted upon.
After he had created all things which are created—it must needs be that there was an opposition, to bring about his eternal purposes in the end of man. [Wherefore, the Lord God gave] the forbidden fruit in opposition to the tree of life, the one being sweet and the other bitter. Wherefore, the Lord God gave unto man that he should act for himself. Wherefore, man could not act for himself save it should be that he were enticed by the one or the other.
This reordering of the text may be not perfect and certainly we can come up with other ways to rearrange the elements of Lehi’s sentences. However, I think this might provide a catalyst for discussing Lehi’s meaning, even if that means, hopefully, disagreeing with this arrangement.
“Forbidden fruit”
Lehi describes the fruit as “forbidden” drawing upon Genesis 2:17 (“But of the tree of the knowledge of good and evil, thou shalt not eat of it”). Notably, the phrase forbidden fruit does not appear in the Bible. The phrase in English (sometimes appearing as fruit forbidden) does seem to be a common expression from the 17th century as found in Sir Walter Raleigh’s The History of the World (1614). In addition, it is possible that the English phrase is ultimately derived from the Latin fructus vetiti or vetiti fructus. Interestingly, a survey of the use of vetiti in Latin writings shows it was also used with phrases vetiti ligni (forbidden tree) and vetiti pomi (forbidden bite). All these phrases can be dated to at least the early 16th century (I don’t see them necessarily derived from the Vulgate). Unfortunately, forbidden tree and forbidden bite never took off in the English language, but forbidden fruit seemed to have made it into circulation. There is more to say about this forbidden language, but I just point it out here since this is the first time the phrase appears in the Book of Mormon.
Things to Act and Things to be Acted Upon, Act for Himself/Themselves/Yourselves
Okay, so let’s dive into this concept a little deeper.
Lehi enumerates God’s creations but then abruptly notes that some things are created to act and some are created to be acted upon. In verse 16, we see that God sets up conditions so that man can act for himself, so at least we know man falls into things created to act. However, Lehi also admits in verse 26 that man can also be acted upon by punishment of the law at the last day. It isn’t clear whether this is the only way that man can be acted upon (its certainly conceivable that man could be acted upon in other ways), and it isn’t clear whether other creations are created to act. Based on 2 Ne 2, man is the only creation mentioned that was created to act. This is further strengthened by Lehi introducing this notion by stating: ”to bring about his eternal purposes in the end of man.” Does this imply that everything else that God created was created to be acted upon? Is God the one acting upon his creations? Does it make sense to say that the tree of life and the forbidden fruit are also things created to be acted upon?
Lehi also uses the phrase “free to act” and “free to choose” in much the same way (verses 26-27). This suggests that act for oneself seems to mean the ability to choose good or evil or life or death.
Are we to understand, in these verses, this enticement to be emanating from the tree of life and the forbidden fruit? What to we make of the fact that it is the tree and fruit that does the enticing in verses 14-16 and not the devil, or God, or the law? Later Nephite interpreters state that it was the devil that did the enticing, and not opposites of the fruit and the tree (Helaman 6:26). Is there anything necessary about this particular “opposition” or is Lehi saying any opposition will do, so long as there is an opposition?
By the way, what happened to Lehi’s opposites? Why is the forbidden fruit an appropriate opposite for tree of life? Why doesn’t Lehi say tree of death and tree of life, or forbidden fruit and permitted fruit? Why are we comparing fruits with trees? Why does Lehi seem to be averse to using the description that is found in the Genesis account: the tree of the knowledge of good and evil? Is this significant? Is this because that name already contains two opposites that might ruins the symmetry Lehi is trying to work out? Would this be awkward for Lehi to claim that one needs more than the tree of knowledge of good and evil in order to have good and evil? Later, Lehi will tell his sons to choose life and not death (verses 28-29). While associating life with tree of life seems clear enough, does Lehi presume the reader will associate death with the forbidden fruit?
And what role does the tree of life play in this discourse? Isn’t the real opposite here between the forbidden fruit on the one hand, and all other fruits on the other hand? After all, the Genesis account never provides instructions to eat the fruit of the tree of life. Even without a tree of life, Adam and Eve could still be enticed by the forbidden fruit, could they not? Are we to understand that the tree of life is also enticing man in the Garden? And if so, in what way? Also, should we bring in anything from Lehi’s dream and Nephi’s vision to bear on the text? Or, should we consider those to be a separate tree of life narrative that is performing a different kind of work than what we find here?
What is the role of the law in all this? Isn’t Lehi just using “forbidden fruit” as a synonym for the temporal law (that he seems to suggest sufficiently instructed man to know good from evil)? Should we really take Lehi’s statement at face value that the tree and the fruit is doing the enticing? Isn’t it really “the law” that allows man to act for himself? Therefore, is it really the case that God needs both the tree of life and the forbidden fruit to create a situation where man can act for himself? Clearly he doesn’t need it today, right? Why does Lehi spend so much time talking about how important the law is (the temporal law and the spiritual law), and then speak as if its really fruits and trees that are creating a reality where man can act for himself? Is there a strategy (literary or theological) behind this move?
And what happens when Adam and Eve are driven from the Garden and neither the tree of life or the forbidden fruit is in existence? Does man lose the ability to act for himself? Is there no enticement? Lehi seems to suggest there are enticements in verses 27-29. This would suggest that post-lapsarian enticements are no longer the forbidden fruit vs. the tree of life, but the devil/will of flesh vs. the mediator/will of Holy Spirit. But on the other hand, wasn’t this always the case? Are these elements interchangeable?
How does the related material found Alma and Helaman, etc., shed light on Lehi’s meaning?
Free Will, Agency, and Act for Yourselves
It is notable that the term agency appears nowhere in the Book of Mormon (although it does appear in the Book of Moses). Is that significant? Should we equate “act for himself” with agency? With free will? Are there any problems with doing this? Some commentators point out the language “act and acted upon” have been used in debates on free will (Augustine, Calvin). Does that context shed any light on Lehi’s meaning?
One thing that strikes me is that God does something after the creation of all things. Lehi says that after God creates all things which are created, then God gives unto man that he should act for himself. Therefore, that man should act for himself doesn’t seem built into the nature of man, but is set up for man by arranging man’s external environment, by providing opposing enticements as it were. If this is the case, I have a couple of comments.
First, Irenaeus interpreted “image of God” (imago dei) to be the source of man’s free will. Now, I’m not suggesting Lehi’s “act for himself” should be equated with the theological concept of “free will.” At least I’m not making an argument here. But supposing these ideas are rough equivalents, we can contrast Lehi’s views with that of Irenaeus. It would seem that, for Irenaeus, he very fact of being created in the likeness and image of God imbues humans with free will. Yet, for Lehi, the mere act of being created in the image of God does not mean man can act for himself. God must do something post-creation. He must set up opposing enticements to create a condition of humans acting for themselves.
Second, isn’t this really reaction? Wouldn’t we think of “acting for oneself” to be acting in the absence of any enticements? Again, all this points to the question of what Lehi means by “act for himself.”
Bitter and Sweet
While I seem to have accepted Skousen’s arguments that there isn’t a good reason to accept Lehi to mean the forbidden fruit is sweet and the tree of life is bitter, is there any argument that Lehi does intend this and that this would be significant? We do have some precedent for sweet being associated with the forbidden: “Stolen waters are sweet, and bread eaten in secret is pleasant.” (Proverbs 9:17). But aside from deciding which description goes with which item, what are we to make of the fact that Lehi describes the fruit and tree with sweet and bitter and not something else like good and evil, or life and death? Or is this implied?
“it must needs be that there was an opposition”
In what ways is the “opposition” in verse 15 different from the “opposition” in verse 11? At least, might we be open to the fact that these might be different?
I like the taxonomy of opposition that Joe suggests: (1) ontological opposition (2) ethical oppositions and (3) existential oppositions. I think this is a useful way to conceptualize Lehi’s statement. Is there anyway we can use this taxonomy to make sense of verse 15? Does it fit into any of these categories?
Remember, Lehi’s conclusion in verses 11-13 is that if there were no opposites then there would be no God or creation. Here, Lehi is talking about an opposition that is created after the creation. In other words, God created several things before creating the forbidden fruit and tree of life. Lehi seems to be suggesting that the whole point of “an opposition” in this case is so that man could act for himself, not so that man would exist at all. Perhaps all of this is to say that Lehi can’t be referring to an ontological opposition. But is Lehi referring to what Joe calls ethical opposition or perhaps existential opposition, or both?
Good stuff here, Rico.
A first comment, and regarding your reordering of the text. Let me first say that I think that this sort of experimentation with the text can be very productive, and can also be very revealing. At the same time, though, a good deal of meaning can be lost. Comparing your reordering with the original, I see six points worth noting about how meaning is lost in the reordering. (And it would be just as possible, of course, to note six points about how meaning is created in the reordering—which is not to say that it’s either a good or a bad thing to create meaning in that way.) Let me note them not as criticisms of the reordering, but as points of interpretation that the reordering brings out about the original. That is, by noting where meaning seems to be lost, perhaps we can see more about the original text that we ought to take into consideration as we interpret the text.
First, then, the reordering places a distance between Lehi’s “all things” and the distinction between things that act and things acted upon. Perhaps, though, the proximity of these is important. Might it be that Lehi wants us to think of “all things,” in its first iteration here, as precisely what is divisible into these two categories?
Second, and closely related, the reordering essentially suggests that it is living beings (humans, animals, birds) that are divided into “all things.” (This is a result in part of the distancing between this incomplete list and the second iteration of “all things” as an aggregative, introduced by the “in fine.”) But might it be that Lehi wants to keep the acting/acted-upon distinction at the abstract level of heaven and earth and “all things” in them? And might it be that living beings aren’t what are supposed to be divided up into things acting and things acted upon—precisely because, perhaps, it is living beings that all end up on the acting side of things?
Third, and already hinted at in the previous point, it may be significant that Lehi only gets specific in the second description of what was created, remaining very general and relatively abstract in the first description. Might this distribution be important to Lehi’s meaning? Might it be important that Lehi only turns to the specifics of creation (albeit, of course, in a kind of quick beginning of list that turns into an aggregative) when he addresses the supplementary opposition necessary for the plan?
Fourth, the reworking of the order of the second sentence changes Lehi’s emphasis, methinks. By opening it with “And to bring about,” etc., Lehi lays heaviest emphasis on God’s intentions, on how the supplement of opposition to the creation achieves something God needs for His plan. To begin it, on the other hand, with the relative prepositional clause beginning with “after,” makes Lehi’s words more narrative in orientation than theoretical or theological—and it relegates God’s purpose to a kind of almost-dispensable note at the end of the sentence, rather than the whole point of it.
Fifth, and already mentioned in a way above, it might be interpretively significant that the second “all things” in this passage is an aggregative. In the reordering, it’s a sheer repetition, rather than a way out of listing everything created. In other words, where in the original text, the first “all things” is an abstract or general term and the second “all things” is an aggregative that allows Lehi to get out of listing all that was created, in the reordering, both “all things” are abstract or general terms.
Sixth, the reordering of the second sentence, the replacement of Lehi’s “even,” and the division of the second sentence into two sentences create a distance between “an opposition” and its specification, making the strict specification murky and vague. The original underscores the nature of the singular opposition in question in a way that’s lost in the reordering, and it may be that that underscoring is of real importance for making sense of Lehi’s claim.
Seventh, finally, the replacement of “even” with “wherefore, the Lord God gave” changes the meaning of the text pretty drastically. It isn’t clear in Lehi’s original whether there was any act on God’s part, an act of creating opposition. We’re only told that there had to be an opposition, and that that opposition was the opposition between the two trees. Was this something God could have avoided? Was it built structurally into things? All this remains fruitfully ambiguous in the original text.
There may be other points worth mentioning here. Again, the point of noting all these isn’t to criticize. Indeed, the reordering is precisely what helps me to see all these points of significance in the original text. The point, then, is just to note that there are aspects of the original I don’t know that I’m ready to leave behind for the sake of flow or clarity. In short, you’ve got your wish: I’m disagreeing, but precisely in a way that, I hope, reveals the catalytic nature of your reordering. In a kind of Hegelian fashion, the self-alienation of the text in its reordering allows for a return into the original text in a fully self-conscious way….
This is excellent Joe. It might not seem like it, but this was the kind of response I was hoping for. And we are on the same page, I expect a critique of the reordering and that helps us make considerations in the text. To clarify, I’m not proposing a new text here, we have the fixed text already at the top of the page. This is merely a tool for exploration.
I want to stress that I’m not relying on the reordered passage for any of my arguments in this post (at least I believe all my arguments can be made from the original text). To simplify things, I will be responding to your comment by referring to the original text.
With that out of the way, let me respond to some of your points.
1. The phrase “all things.” I thought we were agreed that “all things” refers to all things that God has created, exhaustively. Are you suggesting that Lehi has two different categories for “all things”? That is, are you saying that Lehi is using an all things1 and an all things2?
If so, I probably take the position that “all things” includes the entire set of things that have been created by God, including the forbidden fruit and the tree of life. I don’t (yet) see anything significant about grouping “our first parents, and the beasts of the field, and the fowls of the air” because Lehi still qualifies these items by saying “and in fine, all things which are created.” That is, these items too, are included in “all things which are created.” I wonder if Lehi is merely alluding to the language found in Genesis 2:19 “And out of the ground the Lord God formed every beast of the field, and every fowl of the air” as things in the earth that God created. So the language of beasts and fowls invokes the completeness of the creation. In fact, there is an argument to be made that “heaven” should be paired with “fowls of the sky” (the Hebrew shamayim being translated as both heaven and air. The KJV sometimes translates this as fowls of heaven) and “earth” should be paired with “beasts in the field,” that is, “all things that in them is” (although here the Hebrew word is different, but still conceptually linked). If we understand “all things that in them is” to be based on Exodus 20:11, then it would need to include both animals and man as well: “For in six days the Lord made heaven and earth, the sea, and all that in them is, and rested the seventh day.”
2. Is Lehi linking “things to act” with “act for himself”? Or should we make a distinction between these? I have more to say but it will depend on whether these mean the same things or different things.
3. Verse 15 is indeed problematic. I get the sense Lehi never finishes his sentence. I expect something like “And to bring about his eternal purposes in the end of man, [God did X].” But Lehi interrupts mid-sentence to give a chronology. Let me take artistic license to offer an expanded and playful version that gets at what I’m thinking.
Now to bring about his eternal purposes in the end of man, let me tell you what God did. [Pause] But you know what? I’m getting ahead of myself. I have to back up. Okay, so this is after he had created our first parents, and the beasts of the field, and the fowls of the air, and in fine, all things which are created—remember how I was talking about how God created all things? So this is after that. [Pause] You know what? I also left out another thing you have to know for this to make any sense. I forgot to say that it must needs be that there was an opposition [ so that man could act for himself]. What opposition you ask? Well, I’m talking about the the forbidden fruit in opposition to the tree of life. By the way, a funny thing about the flavors of the fruit and the tree, one is sweet and one is bitter. [Pause]. But back to what I was telling you, that’s how God made it so that man could act for himself. I know many of you keep asking me why God put that forbidden fruit in the Garden in the first place, but I’m telling you, without creating the forbidden fruit and the tree of life, man couldn’t act for himself, and acting for himself is part of God’s purpose for man, which is what I’ve been trying to tell you from the beginning.
That’s the sense that I get. In other words, in a round about way, with several digressions, Lehi is saying that God created the forbidden fruit and the tree of life so that there could be an opposition so that man could act for himself; and God needs man to be able to act for himself to bring about his eternal purposes in the end of man (in contrast to his eternal purposes for his other creations).
While Lehi doesn’t explicitly state that it was God who created the forbidden fruit or the tree of life, I think there is no other conclusion but that the God who created all things also created these things. It is also stated in Genesis 2:9 that “out of the ground made the Lord God to grow every tree that is pleasant to the sight, and good for food; the tree of life also in the midst of the garden, and the tree of knowledge of good and evil.” But we know that the nothing in its creation (or structure, as you say) makes the fruit of tree of knowledge of good and evil forbidden. The only thing that makes the fruit forbidden is that God forbids Adam and Eve (or just Adam depending on how you look at the chronology of Genesis). That is, after the creation, God promulgates a law about what can be eaten and what cannot be eaten (the temporal law). So I do think the “after” really does play a crucial role in the narrative. It seems to me that Lehi cannot claim that the “Lord God gave unto man that he should act for himself” unless God is responsible for the forbidden fruit and the tree of life. The text doesn’t seem to make sense if Lehi could say “God gave unto man that he should act for himself” and “to bring about his eternal purposes in the end of man” God didn’t take any action at all but these things just were or spontaneously occurred.
Point by point:
1. I think the (Fregean) distinction between reference and sense is helpful here. Yes, we’re agreed that the referent of “all things” is everything God created. I didn’t mean to suggest otherwise. I meant, rather, to point out the different senses that accompany the phrase in its different iterations in the passage—first as a kind of top-down summary term, and second as a kind of bottom-up aggregative term. In each case, the referent is all that has been created, but “all that has been created” is doing something different in each case.
2. I haven’t any idea. At least not yet.
3. Your imaginative reconstruction is very helpful, opening up a very different reading of what’s going on here. I’ve tended to see a complete sentence (or at least a complete thought) here: all things were created, and then came the need for an opposition. I’ll respond to the rest of what you’re working out on this point in another comment.
Getting on to your comments dealing with substance instead of structure—and I have time only for one brief comment this morning, and then I’ll be traveling over the weekend; I’ll get back to this on Monday.
Forbidden. Yes, these comments are helpful. What strikes me in particular is that (perhaps precisely because “forbidden tree” didn’t make the transition from Latin to English?) we don’t—as I have always unthinkingly taught this!—have an opposition between two trees, but between a tree (the “tree of life”) and fruit (the “forbidden fruit”). Or perhaps the asymmetry of the tree/fruit pairing suggests that the real opposition here is what is “of life” and what is “forbidden.” How might we think about these two ways of thinking about the basic opposition here?
That might speak to your final discussion, regarding the nature of the opposition in question—ontological, ethical, or existential. If, as I think we have reason to believe, the opposition in question is ontological (note the strict parallels between the text of verse 14 and the first sentence of verse 11), how might we regard ontological or fundamental opposition, the possibilizing opposition that lies at the heart of all things, as a question of opposition between tree and fruit, or of opposition between what is “of life” and what is “forbidden”? Is the asymmetry of this opposition precisely what might give us to think we’re dealing with ontological opposition (since there’s a pretty strict symmetry governing the ethical and existential oppositions laid out in verse 11)? How do we think about that?
Well, I’ve asked more questions than answered any, but I’ll be thinking very carefully about all this. You have my thanks for bringing this set of questions out of me.
Yes, we certainly have an asymmetry between fruit and tree. Although, we know (from reason but also scripture) that behind the forbidden fruit is a forbidden tree and behind the tree of life is a fruit of the tree of life. But be that as it may, Lehi has made a choice to use the term “forbidden fruit” as opposed to “fruit of the tree of knowledge of good and evil.”
One hypothesis I’m entertaining is that this is deliberate on Lehi’s part. What reasons could we imagine for why Lehi may not want to use this name? First of all, the name of the tree already contains opposites “good and evil.” That’s a problem. Plus, it contains the term “knowledge,” which, the way I look at it, Lehi isn’t very concerned with in this discourse. Lehi is telling a narrative that, at its heart, isn’t about knowledge or certainly not about becoming like the gods. And perhaps as a result, the Book of Mormon never repeats the phrase “tree of knowledge of good and evil.”
But what other phrase can Lehi use in its place? He can’t simply say tree or fruit because there are many trees and many fruits. He can’t say good or evil because he wants to show how good and evil come from opposites, not from the fruit itself, and he is already setting up opposites with both the forbidden fruit on the one hand and the tree of life on the other. So for Lehi, it’s almost like he doesn’t want to say “the bite” allowed man to act for himself, he wants to say before any bite occurred, the existence of forbidden fruit and the tree of life, enticing man one way or the other, allowed “man to act for himself.”
If that’s Lehi’s goal, then a good choice is to use the label “forbidden fruit” because the reference is clear. There is only one tree’s fruit that was forbidden. This allows him to avoid complicating good and evil and knowledge in his discourse. I suppose he could use fruit of the tree of life, which probably could have worked as well and added more symmetry. In fact, this is how Alma understand the narrative and he uses the phrase “fruit of the tree of life” several times (Alma 5:34, 62; Alma 12:21, 23; Alma 32:40). “Come and be baptized unto repentance, that ye also may be partakers of the fruit of the tree of life.” (Alma 5:62).
I’m going to be thinking about this a great deal. I’m inclined to see in the asymmetry a crucial structural point. It may be that at the ontological—as opposed to the ethical or the existential—level, “opposition” isn’t or even can’t be symmetrical opposition, “binarity,” we might say. I hear something like this idea at work in the strange wording of the first sentence of verse 11: an opposition, in all things. It’s as if there has to be some kind of rift, some kind of fundamental inconsistency. (I’ve done a bit of textual work on this approach here.)
Maybe I can illustrate this in the following, confessedly bizarre way.
At the turn of the century, a number of philosophers of mathematics were trying to figure out how to provide the number system with a kind of foundation. One thinker in particular, Gottlob Frege, attempted to root mathematics in (indubitable) logical truths. The project, that is, was to show how all the laws of mathematics were derivable from the laws of logic. Frege argued powerfully against other possible ways of founding the laws of mathematics, and then he set about the task of articulating the logicist foundation. Things went swimmingly until a young Bertrand Russell wrote to Frege to show him how the fifth of Frege’s five “basic laws” of arithmetic could be used to derive a contradiction. The consistency of Frege’s project was ruined, and further attempts to shore up the logicist project failed.
In thinking about ontological opposition, I want to think not about the moment where the derived contradiction emerges—not about the moment where a kind of direct opposition between two incommensurable terms emerges—but about the earlier, pregnant moment where that contradiction becomes possible, becomes implicitly inscribed in the system, but unconsciously, as it were. What would derivatively become stark opposition, explicit inconsistency in the shape of the opposition between P and not-P, begins as a kind of underground inconsistency written invisibly into the heart of things. And that inconsistency takes the shape not of “mere” opposition, symmetrical opposition, but of law—in Frege’s case, “basic law V.”
It’s in this sense that I want to think about “ontological” opposition, possibilizing opposition. It’s a question less of term-by-term symmetry than of a kind of absolute pre- or proscription. It’s a question, maybe, just of law.
It’s with that in mind that I want to think about “the forbidden.”
Of course, I have a great deal more I want to think out loud about here: What’s going on, anew, with the juxtaposition of “forbidden” and “of life”? And what’s going on, anew, with the juxtaposition of “fruit” and “tree”? I’m convinced there’s much to learn by thinking more carefully about those.
Rico — this is very thought provoking.
I was intrigued by your list of textual influences, particularly the phrase “Bring about…eternal purposes (2 Nephi 2:15, Alma 37:7, 42:26, Mormon 5:26). You’ve commented before on the connections between 2 Nephi 2 and Alma 42 and this phrase jumped out at me as another example.
Just prior to Lehi’s reference regarding God bringing “about his eternal purposes in the end of man” he talks about God creating “things to act and things to be acted upon.” As you point out, “Lehi also admits in verse 26 that man can also be acted upon by punishment of the law at the last day.” I wonder if there is a connecting point here, in terms of how Alma uses the parallel phrase “And thus God bringeth about his great and eternal purposes.”
After giving a list of causes and effects similar to those put forth by Lehi, Alma makes a statement that could be construed as an instance in which man is acted upon: “Justice exerciseth all his demands, and also mercy claimeth all which is her own; and thus, none but the truly penitent are saved. What, do ye suppose that mercy can rob justice? I say unto you, Nay; not one whit. If so, God would cease to be God. And thus God bringeth about his great and eternal purposes.
If we continue with Alma’s words, it seems to me that “being acted upon” can in at least one sense have a positive connotation, in that we can be acted upon to receive salvation: “And thus cometh about the salvation and the redemption of men, and also their destruction and misery.”
Just following Lehi’s use of the phrase “bring about…eternal purposes,” Lehi states, “the Lord God gave unto man that he should act for himself.” Nobody is forced one way or another. This is parallel to Alma’s statement (made just after he employs the phrase “bring about…eternal purposes,”), “Whosoever will come may come and partake of the waters of life freely; and whosoever will not come the same is not compelled to come; but in the last day it shall be restored unto him according to his deeds.”
Thanks for opening up this phrase – it’s helping me make better sense of 2 Nephi 2 and Alma 42, and also pushing me to want to do a closer comparison of these two chapters.
John, thanks for bringing up Alma 42 as a text influenced by Lehi’s discourse. In terms of language, one difference is that 2 Ne. 2:15 includes the modifier “in the end of man” which doesn’t seem to be repeated in the Book of Mormon text. However, contextually, I get the sense these other passages are also concerning “the end of man.”
What really is interesting to me, however, is that Alma (in chapter 42) does not repeat the language of “act and acted upon.” In fact, other than Lehi, no Nephite ever will repeat this phrase. It’s not clear what this means, if anything. Perhaps, no one really knows what Lehi means by the term “acted upon.” However, we do get a couple of variants:
“Wherefore, he gave commandments unto men, they having first transgressed the first commandments as to things which were temporal, and becoming as gods, knowing good from evil, placing themselves in a state to act, or being placed in a state to act according to their wills and pleasures, whether to do evil or to do good.” (Alma 12:31).
What’s interesting here is that Alma departs in a crucial way from Lehi. Alma is saying that men place themselves in a state to act. Lehi says that God places man in a state to act by establishing opposites. I see this as a radically different theological paradigm. It might be that Alma is trying to correct his mistake when he supplements his record with “or being placed in a state to act” and leaving out the subject. Again, as I wrote in my comment to Joe above, I think Lehi is saying that Adam and Eve could act for themselves not at the moment they partook of the fruit, but at the moment there existed two opposing enticements. Alma seems to abandon Lehi’s idea in favor of the fruit doing the work. I think Lehi was trying to avoid this conclusion.
“And now remember, remember, my brethren, that whosoever perisheth, perisheth unto himself; and whosoever doeth iniquity, doeth it unto himself; for behold, ye are free; ye are permitted to act for yourselves; for behold, God hath given unto you a knowledge and he hath made you free. He hath given unto you that ye might know good from evil, and he hath given unto you that ye might choose life or death; and ye can do good and be restored unto that which is good, or have that which is good restored unto you; or ye can do evil, and have that which is evil restored unto you.” (Helaman 14:30-31).
Samuel the Lamanite, like Alma, locates man’s freedom in knowledge, even though he states that it was God who provided this knowledge. However, this does not seem to be Lehi’s project either. Lehi, under my reading, is not saying that knowledge makes man free, but rather that opposing enticements allow man to be free to choose. So, I see both Alma and Samuel to be abandoning Lehi’s theory of freedom arising from opposing enticements, in favor of a theory of freedom arsing from knowledge of good and evil.
I’m interested in the conversation around acting, and not being acted upon. If I understand your reasoning, Lehi is positing that the freedom to act comes from opposing enticements, whereas Alma and Samuel the Lamanite base the freedom to act on knowledge. I wonder if the three of them were sitting in a room if they would disagree or if these are simply different ways of expressing the same ideas.
The example you point out in Alma 12 is really interesting. So we have
“It must needs be that there was an opposition; even the forbidden fruit in opposition to the tree of life; the one being sweet and the other bitter. Wherefore, the Lord God gave unto man that he should act for himself. Wherefore, man could not act for himself save it should be that he was enticed by the one or the other” (2 Nephi 2:15-16)
VERSUS
“Wherefore, he gave commandments unto men, they having first transgressed the first commandments as to things which were temporal, and becoming as gods, knowing good from evil, placing themselves in a state to act, or being placed in a state to act according to their wills and pleasures, whether to do evil or to do good.” (Alma 12:31).
It does seem that Lehi is stating that the power to act came when there were opposing forces, namely “the forbidden fruit in opposition to the tree of life.” Now as you mention, Alma’s second clause, being placed in a state to act could be crucial. Especially with the presence of “or” preceding it, it is as though Alma is stating those phrases as equal points. But they aren’t (or at least don’t appear to be). Did they place themselves in a state to act (by partaking of the fruit) or were they placed in a state to act (by being presented with opposing fruits). Another possibility is that Alma is saying they placed themselves in a position to act by partaking of the fruit, or, as a result of partaking of a fruit they were placed (by their own actions in partaking) in a state to act.
I looked into other instances in which Alma discusses the concept of opposites. While he mentions it in Alma 41:11-13, I think the more germane occurrence is in back in Alma 42. Alma states, “Repentance could not come unto men except there were a punishment, which also was eternal as the life of the soul should be, affixed opposite to the plan of happiness, which was as eternal also as the life of the soul. Now, how could a man repent except he should sin? How could he sin if there was no law? How could there be a law save there was a punishment?”
This section, and that following is obviously reminiscent of 2 Nephi 2:11-15. Alma describes an eternal punishment being fixed in opposition to an eternal plan of happiness. This opposition launches Alma into a discussion about how without factors (opposites) such as sin and law God would cease to be God … just as Lehi said that without opposing forces such as sin and law there would be no God. To me this indicates that Alma is familiar with Lehi’s previous argument and I’m wondering to what extent (if any) he is deviating from it — or if he is acknowledging that opposition is a key factor in man’s ability to act.
As to Samuel the Lamanite’s statement, I’m wondering if it is a derivative of one made by Jacob, rather than a commentary on the words of Lehi or Alma. Jacob is closest in time to Lehi, and best able to provide insight as to what Lehi might have meant by the word “act.” But while he mentions the idea of acting he makes no comment as to where the freedom comes from when he says, “cheer up your hearts, and remember that ye are free to act for yourselves—to choose the way of everlasting death or the way of eternal life” (2 Nephi 10:23).
Samuel also says, “Ye are free…to act for yourselves; for behold, God…hath given unto you that ye might choose life or death” (Helaman 14:30-31).
Given the parallels between those verses, there is a clear connection. However, as you point out, one way or another, Samuel (unlike Jacob) connects the ability to “act for yourselves” with knowledge. As Samuel continues to focus on knowledge (Helaman 15:6, 7, 11, 13) he again seems to tie back to Jacob.
Jacob had taught that “Our children shall be restored, that they may come to that which will give them the true knowledge of their Redeemer” (2 Nephi 10:2). Samuel the Lamanite says, “And this is according to the prophecy, that they [the Lamanites] shall again be brought to the true knowledge, which is the knowledge of their Redeemer” (Helaman 15:13).
So I guess part of the sense I’m making of Samuel’s statement is that when he uses the word “knowledge” it is less a commentary on knowledge providing the freedom to act and more a statement about the knowledge that the contemporary Nephites had been given and how that knowledge (in contrast to the lesser knowledge received by the Lamanites) would make them accountable for their actions. Now I could still be persuaded otherwise, and this obviously needs more untangling than I can give it right now. I’m wondering, did is Samuel abandon “Lehi’s theory of freedom arising from opposing enticements, in favor of a theory of freedom arising from knowledge of good and evil” or was this more a statement about the status of the knowledge of the Nephites in his day and time?
I’m interested in the conversation around acting, and not being acted upon. If I understand your reasoning, Lehi is positing that the freedom to act comes from opposing enticements, whereas Alma and Samuel the Lamanite base the freedom to act on knowledge. I wonder if the three of them were sitting in a room if they would disagree or if these are simply different ways of expressing the same ideas.
The example you point out in Alma 12 is really interesting. So we have
“It must needs be that there was an opposition; even the forbidden fruit in opposition to the tree of life; the one being sweet and the other bitter. Wherefore, the Lord God gave unto man that he should act for himself. Wherefore, man could not act for himself save it should be that he was enticed by the one or the other” (2 Nephi 2:15-16)
VERSUS
“Wherefore, he gave commandments unto men, they having first transgressed the first commandments as to things which were temporal, and becoming as gods, knowing good from evil, placing themselves in a state to act, or being placed in a state to act according to their wills and pleasures, whether to do evil or to do good.” (Alma 12:31).
It does seem that Lehi is stating that the power to act came when there were opposing forces, namely “the forbidden fruit in opposition to the tree of life.” Now as you mention, Alma’s second clause, being placed in a state to act could be crucial. Especially with the presence of “or” preceding it, it is as though Alma is stating those phrases as equal points. But they aren’t (or at least don’t appear to be). Did they place themselves in a state to act (by partaking of the fruit) or were they placed in a state to act (by being presented with opposing fruits). Another possibility is that Alma is saying they placed themselves in a position to act by partaking of the fruit, or, as a result of partaking of a fruit they were placed (by their own actions in partaking) in a state to act.
I looked into other instances in which Alma discusses the concept of opposites. While he mentions it in Alma 41:11-13, I think the more germane occurrence is in back in Alma 42. Alma states, “Repentance could not come unto men except there were a punishment, which also was eternal as the life of the soul should be, affixed opposite to the plan of happiness, which was as eternal also as the life of the soul. Now, how could a man repent except he should sin? How could he sin if there was no law? How could there be a law save there was a punishment?”
This section, and that following is obviously reminiscent of 2 Nephi 2:11-15. Alma describes an eternal punishment being fixed in opposition to an eternal plan of happiness. This opposition launches Alma into a discussion about how without factors (opposites) such as sin and law God would cease to be God … just as Lehi said that without opposing forces such as sin and law there would be no God. To me this indicates that Alma is familiar with Lehi’s previous argument and I’m wondering to what extent (if any) he is deviating from it — or if he is acknowledging that opposition is a key factor in man’s ability to act.
As to Samuel the Lamanite’s statement, I’m wondering if it is a derivative of one made by Jacob, rather than a commentary on the words of Lehi or Alma. Jacob is closest in time to Lehi, and best able to provide insight as to what Lehi might have meant by the word “act.” But while he mentions the idea of acting he makes no comment as to where the freedom comes from when he says, “cheer up your hearts, and remember that ye are free to act for yourselves—to choose the way of everlasting death or the way of eternal life” (2 Nephi 10:23).
Samuel also says, “Ye are free…to act for yourselves; for behold, God…hath given unto you that ye might choose life or death” (Helaman 14:30-31).
Given the parallels between those verses, there is a clear connection. However, as you point out, one way or another, Samuel (unlike Jacob) connects the ability to “act for yourselves” with knowledge. As Samuel continues to focus on knowledge (Helaman 15:6, 7, 11, 13) he again seems to tie back to Jacob.
Jacob had taught that “Our children shall be restored, that they may come to that which will give them the true knowledge of their Redeemer” (2 Nephi 10:2). Samuel the Lamanite says, “And this is according to the prophecy, that they [the Lamanites] shall again be brought to the true knowledge, which is the knowledge of their Redeemer” (Helaman 15:13).
So I guess part of the sense I’m making of Samuel’s statement is that when he uses the word “knowledge” it is less a commentary on knowledge providing the freedom to act and more a statement about the knowledge that the contemporary Nephites had been given and how that knowledge (in contrast to the lesser knowledge received by the Lamanites) would make them accountable for their actions. Now I could still be persuaded otherwise, and this obviously needs more untangling than I can give it right now. I’m wondering, did is Samuel abandon “Lehi’s theory of freedom arising from opposing enticements, in favor of a theory of freedom arising from knowledge of good and evil” or was this more a statement about the status of the knowledge of the Nephites in his day and time?
John, thanks for this. I’m convinced you are right about Samuel. One thing that occurred to me as I continue to think on these verses is that when Lehi speaks of “freedom” in relation to the atonement.
“And because that they are redeemed from the fall, they have become free forever.” (verse 26).
So it would appear we have two situations, so to speak. Initially, God gives “unto man that he should act for himself” through, as I argue, setting up two opposing enticements (I try to avoid using the term forces only because this term seems to be based in 19th century science and I’m not sure whether this might be misleading because forces by definition “act upon” objects and this could confuse our conception). But man lost something through the fall. I’m not sure whether we should articulate this as the ability to act or freedom to act. Later, Aaron touches on this when he tells Lamoni’s father: “And since man had fallen he could not merit anything of himself; but the sufferings and death of Christ atone for their sins, through faith and repentance, and so forth.” (Aaron in Alma 22:14). But when we speak of things after the fall, the freedom to act for oneself came through redemption.
(Here, however, I think we need to be careful when understanding the term redemption because the Book of Mormon uses redemption in several ways, redemption from death, redemption from sin, and here, I sense, redemption of freedom to choose, or something like that).
But I think you are right that we could read Samuel’s words in the following way:
[F]or behold, ye are free; ye are permitted to act for yourselves; for behold, God hath given unto you a knowledge [of the plan of redemption] and he hath made you free [by redeeming man from the fall].
In this way, knowledge need not be understood as knowledge of good and evil originating from the tree of knowledge of good and evil, but knowledge of the plan of redemption.
I think this reading is further supported by Samuel’s words in chapter 15:
And behold, ye do know of yourselves, for ye have witnessed it, that as many of them as are brought to the knowledge of the truth, and to know of the wicked and abominable traditions of their fathers, and are led to believe the holy scriptures, yea, the prophecies of the holy prophets, which are written, which leadeth them to faith on the Lord, and unto repentance, which faith and repentance bringeth a change of heart unto them—Therefore, as many as have come to this, ye know of yourselves are firm and steadfast in the faith, and in the thing wherewith they have been made free. (Samuel, in Helaman 15:7-8).
This is an important distinction I need to think about. In a sense, the knowledge is still has redemptive qualities. As if God has redeemed man from the fall and become free forever, even those who are ignorant of the plan (remember Jacob’s concern about those who do not have the law in 2 Ne. 9:25 and how they are still redeemed). But without knowledge of the plan of redemption (and the conditions of repentance), somehow man is not free. Does that make sense?
As for Alma 42, I think it is clear this has to be related to 2 Ne. 2; the connections are too numerous. I do think, however, that Alma elaborates on the law in subtle ways that Lehi does not. For example, Alma asks if there were no law would men be afraid to murder or sin. (Alma 42:19-20). This, to me, is more of a deterrence theory of law, which I do not see Lehi utilizing focusing on or making explicit.
Great discussion, Rico and John. I’m wrestling with what I might add. Perhaps just a couple of points that haven’t really been mentioned that may (or may not) shape the way we read the relevant texts in 2 Nephi 2.
First, I think it’s worth noticing that there are some difficulties about the word “entice.” In the KJV rendering of the OT, the word is univocally negative, always referring to seduction into some kind of evil. It’s perhaps a little more ambiguous in its infrequent NT instances, but there’s good reason to suspect the same. The 1828 Webster’s concurs, giving the possibility of a “good” interpretation of the word only as a last definition. The Book of Mormon, however, is interesting. Mosiah 3:19 and Moroni 7:13 use “entice” to refer to good things—the enticings of the Holy Spirit, and God’s enticing us to do good. But even in the case of the Book of Mormon, every other instance is unequivocally bad. How does all that bear on 2 Nephi 2:16?
Perhaps relevant here is the obvious logical continuity in 2 Nephi 2 between verse 16′s reference to enticement and what is recounted in verses 17-18: Eve and Adam had to be enticed by the one or the other; enter the devil. As Lehi tells the story, Eve and Adam were enticed only by the “bad” option. Although “enticed by the one or the other” sounds ambiguous, the way it cashes out is less ambiguous.
It’s also important to ask, I think, about exactly what’s implied by the two “wherefore’s” of verse 16. There isn’t an obvious interpretation of the first one, of how it’s functioning. It’d feel more natural to have something like “Now” there. There also isn’t an obvious interpretation of the second one, of how it’s functioning. It’d feel more natural to have something like “But” there. The connections here are vague, and that makes it difficult to know how to move forward with verse 16, I think.
This phrase “for himself” deserves attention, even independently of the verb “to act,” it seems to me. When the phrase is used in the way it is here, it seems to mean something like “as one’s own representative.” If one “answers for herself,” or if one “thinks for herself,” or if one “acts for herself,” it is because one serves as one’s own double, both as oneself and as one’s representative. In being “for oneself,” there’s a kind of division of the self, the development of a kind of self-reflexivity even. One acts as one’s own steward or agent, commissioned to represent oneself appropriately. (I’m thinking, in a certain way, of Romans 7, Paul’s impassioned aside about the split self—as well as of 2 Nephi 4, the Book of Mormon parallel to this text.) Might it be that what God aims to do is less to establish some kind of free will—whatever that might mean—than to split the subjectivity of humankind?
If that last comment isn’t entirely misguided, we might play with the possibility that the second half of verse 16 is tying the question of enticement to the splitting of the subject, no? How can the kind of doubling necessary to self-representation—necessary to agency, strictly speaking—be accomplished? Perhaps only by seduction. (If my talk of splitting the subject has rather obvious roots in Freud, I suppose you could say that I’m now playing with a parallel “seduction theory,” of a sort.) Is the point that forbiddenness isn’t enough in and of itself to get from implicit ontological inconsistency to explicit existential and ethical oppositions unless it’s coupled with some kind of subjective investment, some kind of desire. The law that forbids establishes only half of what’s necessary to split the subject; it has to be doubled by the allurement necessary for the birth of desire. (In Freudian terms: condensation has to be coupled with displacement; in Lacanian terms: metaphor has to be coupled with metonymy. Okay, my apologies for this parenthetical!)
Finally, I think it’s well worth considering whether verse 16′s “act for himself” shouldn’t be understood to be intentionally distinct from verse 26′s “act for themselves” precisely because the latter is uniquely coupled with “not to be acted upon.” I’m inclined to see in verse 16 God’s attempt to produce, as a kind of first step, the possibility of human beings acting for themselves while nonetheless being acted upon. It’s only with the full fruition of this first possibility—ejection from the garden, etc.—that God intervenes the second time through the messianic gesture, which allows acting for itself to be, in the end, uncoupled from being acted upon. The fall, we might say, is meant to induce a split in the subject, but that split remains debilitating. The atonement, then, comes along to heal the wound of that split, but not by ridding us of our doubled nature; instead, the atonement leaves the split in place while de-traumatizing the relationship between the two “parts” of the subject.
Well, that got a bit more interpretive in the end than I expected. I have something to contribute after all!
Joe, thanks for digging deeper into the term “entice” (I’ve added these important references to the Textual Influences section).
I’ve had many of the same questions you raise here. Is “to entice” positive or negative? Although we do have Mosiah 3:19 “the enticings of the Holy Spirit” as positive (and I see this to be connected to verse 28 “choose eternal life according to the will of his Holy Spirit”), I think you are right that overwhelmingly, it is used in a negative sense as in Jacob’s “remember the awfulness in transgressing against that Holy God, and also the awfulness of yielding to the enticings of that cunning one” (2 Ne. 9:39). In terms of 2 Ne. 2:16, however, to be enticed as such seems neither positive nor negative since Lehi is stressing that one must be enticed “by the one or the other” so that one could “act for oneself.” I find it interesting and significant that Moroni 7:13 adds “invite and entice” as if to temper the negative connotation of entice with the more positive invite.
Your interpretation of “Wherefore” in verse 16 is intriguing: “Now, the Lord God gave unto man that he should act for himself. But, man could not act for himself save it should be that he were enticed by the one or the other.”
Under this interpretation, God “setting up” the forbidden tree and the tree of life by itself is not sufficient. Adam and Eve need to be enticed one way or the other? The flow of the sermon then moves to the devil. So, the logic is there that the forbidden fruit isn’t doing the enticing but rather the devil. But, as you point out, there is an omission in Lehi’s narrative because we never get a corresponding paragraph discussing the being who is enticing them to, supposedly, partake of the fruit of the tree of life. What are we to make of that omission? I wonder if this is deliberate or strategic, what would happen if this wasn’t an omission?
In terms of “act for himself” to mean agent. Should we look at the language D&C 29 here? Again, this will depend on our thoughts about the relationship between the Book of Mormon and subsequent revelation. However, I find it interesting that D&C 29 repopulates the phrase “act for himself” with the phrase “agent unto himself”:
Behold I
give<gave> unto him that he should be an agent unto himself . . . itcame to passMust needs be that the Devil should tempt the children of men or they could not be agents unto themselves for if they never should have bitter they could not k[n]ow the Sweet Wherefore it came to pass that the Devil tempted Adam & he partook of the forbiden fruit & transgressed the commandment wherein he became subject to the will of the Devil Because he yielded unto temptation (September 1830).You write:
I’m inclined to see in verse 16 God’s attempt to produce, as a kind of first step, the possibility of human beings acting for themselves while nonetheless being acted upon.
This is very interesting. I’m wondering (either along with you, or perhaps in a different direction but at least prompted by your statement) whether we should see “to be enticed” as a kind of “to be acted upon”? There is this “yielding” language that the Book of Mormon keeps repeating: whether yielding to the enticings of the Holy Spirit, or yielding to the enticings of the cunning one. Should we simply just understand this as being acted upon by the Holy Spirit or being acted upon by the devil? How else should we understand “to yield” other than to mean “to allow yourself to be acted upon”?
Augustine, in De Correptione et Gratia wrote:
But let them rather understand that if they are the children of God, they are led by the Spirit of God to do that which should be done; and when they have done it, let them give thanks to Him by whom they act. For they are acted upon that they may act, not that they may themselves do nothing [aguntur enim ut agant, non ut ipsi nihil agant]; and in addition to this, it is shown them what they ought to do, so that when they have done it as it ought to be done— that is, with the love and the delight of righteousness— they may rejoice in having received “the sweetness which the Lord has given, that their land should yield her increase.” But when they do not act, whether by not doing at all or by not doing from love, let them pray that what as yet they have not, they may receive. For what shall they have which they shall not receive? Or what have they which they have not received? (italics added).
Obviously, there are issues related to free will and grace here, and it might be coincidentally that this particular English translation uses the phrase “acted upon” because certainly other translations state it differently. Still, it’s interesting to entertain the idea that we must be acted upon or else we cannot act. King Benjamin alludes to something similar, perhaps in a slightly different context, when he says: “I say unto you that if ye should serve him who has created you from the beginning, and is preserving you from day to day, by lending you breath, that ye may live and move and do according to your own will. . . ” (Mosiah 2:21). Or to put it differently, we can’t even move according to our own will unless God takes some action upon us.
Rico, this was very productive—thanks for jumping in here. I found your lines of questioning especially useful, so I’m going to start there with a few questions and responses.
1) “Why are we comparing fruits with trees?” I, like Joe mentioned, paused and realized that I’d been unthinkingly teaching this situation as opposition between two trees. When you pointed out the actual nature of this comparison, it made me pause.
I wonder if it’s useful to see think about this question in terms of seeds. That is, both the tree and the fruit provide (distinct) ways of accessing/producing seeds.
For the tree, seeds are created from the tree itself. It grows them. It produces them. It creates them.
For the fruit, seeds are accessed through the consumption of the fruit and the resulting exposure of the seeds. The fruit hides seeds; seeds result through the removal of the flesh of the fruit.
Thus, Lehi appears to be setting a distinction between internal and external ways of producing seeds. (Behind this analysis I’m drawing on an understanding of “seeds” deriving from Alma 32, where the point of planting the seed is to grow the tree of life within oneself so that fruit is produced and can be consumed, thereby exposing seeds that can then be shared with and planted by others.)
I have more responses, but I need to run to PT right now. Still, better to get something up than nothing, right? :)
Ok, I’m back.
2) Lehi’s use of “act for himself.” As you point out, we often (perhaps always?) read this in terms of free will / agency, especially given the contexts of choice and enticement implicit in the final sentence: “man could not act for himself save it should be that he were enticed by the one or the other.”
In the spirit of experimentation, I read the phrase “act for himself” in terms of self interest rather than will. Doing this, “act for himself” is thus understood as acting for one’s own self, in one’s self interest, i.e., selfishly.
Reading verse 16 in this new light: “Wherefore, the Lord God gave unto man that he should act for himself [instead of others]. Wherefore, man could not act for himself [i.e., could not put his self-interest first] save it should be that he were enticed by the one or the other.” In other words, man could not be selfish unless he first was enticed—unless his desires were drawn out such that he was able to claim in his selfishness his desire for one object over the other.
To me, this interpretation highlights another interesting opposition: the opposition between man (self-interested / internally oriented) and God (other-interested / externally oriented). The whole of the atonement pivots around this tension: Christ puts off the natural man (self-interest) in order to be the Son of God (other-interested) in order to go through his life and the atonement.
I love how you are “experimenting” with possible meanings. Searching Google Books for the phrase “act for himself” brought up some interesting results, some of which approximate the idea of acting in one’s self interest:
“I, therefore, think the true ground is that the agent, being a person appointed when the principal could act for himself to act for him, when the principal, according to law, cannot act for himself” (American Law Register, 1880)
From a case in 1830: “He is not the officer or agent of the corporation, but is understood to act for himself as entirely as a tavern-keeper, or any other person who may carry on any business.”
I suppose that these usages could also be couched in terms of free will, but I think there is something to do the idea of “act for one’s own self.” That’s an interesting idea to keep exploring.
John, these are cases in agency law, where the agent acts on behalf of the principal, but only as authorized by the principal. Strictly speaking, only the principal can “act for himself.” Agents can never act for themselves. An agent can only act as directed by the principal. Therefore, in order to clarify that a person is not an agent, meaning that the person is a principal, we must use the language “act for himself.” Now, in agency law these actions are not colored by moral implication. In other words, we would not say that the principal is by definition “selfish” and the agent is by definition “selfless.”
This also seems to be the case in religious sermons where God, it is said, acts for himself.
Does not God make all things for himself? Does he not always act for himself? Is he not always his own End? Has not this the Evidence of a First Principle, That God acts only for himself? We must therefore of necessity conclude, That as God is the Author of this Motion, so he is the Natural End and Term of it too; and that he moves us to Good no otherwise, than by moving us towards himself. We must conclude, that God is the true great Magnet of our Souls; that he continually draws and moves them, not from, but to himself, as being both their, and his own great End. (John Norris, 1707).
Whence it will follow, that as GOD must therefore be his own End, and whatever he wills or acts he must will and act for himself (as I have already represented it in the Discourse of Divine Love) so also that the Love which is in us must be the Effect of that very Love which GOD has for himself, there being no other Principle in the Nature of GOD whereby he is supposed to act. (Mary Astell, 1705).
Last one.
3) Regarding the opposition between sweet and bitter: I think it’s significant somehow in this discussion that Lehi uses “sweet” and “bitter” rather than ethical or moral adjectives, or inevitably universal experiences (i.e., life and death).
Sweet and bitter are adjectivally subjective. They must be experienced by a body and understood in terms of one’s unique judgment or assessment of those experiences. Sweet and bitter contextualize a situation in terms of possibility, in terms of subjective experience.
In using these adjectives, Lehi not only posits the necessity of opposition, but the necessity of individual, embodied experience with those opposites.
Jenny, I really appreciate these points.
1. This is an interesting way to look at the issue. Are you suggesting we could see the difference to be that tree of knowledge of good and evil is producing seeds via fruit, but the tree of life is producing seeds without fruit? I don’t know why but that makes it sound like producing seeds through fruit is much better. Are you suggesting that perhaps the fruit has an allusion to flesh? As I mentioned to Joe, the phrase “fruit of the tree of life” (or in some cases a clear reference to the fact that the tree of life bears fruit) is, in fact, employed by the Book of Mormon text several times (1 Nephi 15:36; Alma 5:34, 62; Alma 12:21, 23; Alma 32:40; Alma 42:3). Does that change anything? However, at least we can say that Lehi chooses not to emphasize the fruit of the tree of life in his sermon.
2. This reminds me of something Sheila pointed out in one of her SMPT presentations. Alma 42:7 “And now, ye see by this that our first parents were cut off both temporally and spiritually from the presence of the Lord; and thus we see they became subjects to follow after their own will.” Here, Sheila pointed out that the Book of Mormon doesn’t portray this as anything positive but actually as something quiet negative. So, for example, while Joe’s reading above is that “act for oneself” could be understood as “act as an agent for oneself” your reading is “act for oneself” could be understood as “to act in one’s self-interest” where self-interest would be negative as in selfish? Is that accurate?
3. I tend to agree with you that “Sweet and bitter are adjectivally subjective.” On the other hand, I’m somewhat struck by how the Book of Mormon seems to use these terms to as something that is anything but subjective but rather that is very clear.
Wo unto them that call evil good, and good evil, that put darkness for light, and light for darkness, that put bitter for sweet, and sweet for bitter! ( 2 Nephi 15:20; Isaiah 5:20).
Yea, I say unto you, my son, that there could be nothing so exquisite and so bitter as were my pains. Yea, and again I say unto you, my son, that on the other hand, there can be nothing so exquisite and sweet as was my joy. (Alma 36:21).
In exploring your idea about associating flavor with experience, I’m contemplating the terms “know” and “knew.” I’m wondering if those imply experience? The 1828 edition of Webster’s under know contains this sentence: “We know what we see with our eyes, or perceive by other senses.” I still need to think on these issues.